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INTRODUCTION

The distinction between public and private spheres is a central theme in
free expression doctrine. Most fundamentally, it separates the public realm
of First Amendment state action from private contexts in which the
Amendment does not operate.1 It inhabits the law of defamation as well,
when libel plaintiffs are classified as limited-purpose public figures, having
“thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”2 And in cases that clearly
fall within the First Amendment’s ambit, there is sometimes enhanced
protection for speech that addresses a matter of public — rather than private
— concern. In cases concerning public-employee speech,3 libel doctrine,4
and infliction of emotional distress,5 the U.S. Supreme Court has crafted an
über-protected subset of speech that “is at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection.”6 Indeed, one legal scholar has pointed out that “the public
concern question is pivotal in at least five different areas of modern
communication law.”7 In addition to defamation doctrine and publicemployee speech law, it is critical in reporter privilege cases, invasion of
privacy doctrine, and — the topic of this work — state anti-SLAPP law.
In the realm of anti-SLAPP statutes, the distinction between public and
private matters is, in fact, the essential demarcation separating expressive
activities that do or do not fall within a state’s statutory protection for
defendants. When scholars Penelope Canan and George W. Pring introduced
the concept of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in
the late 1980s, they were identifying a fairly discrete phenomenon they had
recognized in their sociological research: “lawsuits filed against citizens or
groups for advocating a viewpoint on a public issue in a government
decisional process.”8 The line between public and private was strikingly
clear, as the researchers — and early anti-SLAPP statutes — limited the
scope of the phenomenon by tying it to activities associated with “petition,”
or speech concerning government activity.
But a funny thing happened as states rolled out anti-SLAPP statutes,
courts went to work interpreting them, and the Internet became a boundless
1. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search
for Government Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333 (1997).
2. Gerts v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (emphasis added).
3. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
4. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
5. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 433 (2011).
6. Id. at 451-452 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 758-59 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
7. Clay Calvert, Defining Public Concern After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable Standard Mingles with
News Media Complexity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 40 (2012).
8. Penelope Canan and George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC. REV. 385 (1988) (citations
omitted).
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public forum with myriad citizens “advocating a viewpoint” on just about
everything. By the late 1990s, the original understanding of SLAPPs had
expanded, and when states crafted amendments to broaden their anti-SLAPP
laws, “petition” was typically joined by variations of “speech regarding a
matter of public concern.” Now, of course, the distinction between public
and private wasn’t as obvious, and courts were required to take a more active
role in drawing that line. Ultimately, anti-SLAPP law came to encompass
vastly more litigation than Canan and Pring could have dreamt of.
Strikingly, three of the largest and most influential states have made
profound alterations in their approaches to the “matter of public concern”
question in the anti-SLAPP context since 2019. California, New York, and
Texas are each in the midst of a fundamental shift in how their courts
determine what constitutes a public matter.
This article will examine how legislatures and courts have wrestled with
the public/private distinction in anti-SLAPP law in recent years. First, it will
examine how state legislatures have crafted “speech regarding a matter of
public concern” amendments into their anti-SLAPP statutes, suggesting a
loose taxonomy of statutory approaches. Next, the article will explore the
Connick/Snyder “public concern” concept within First Amendment law,
which has been influential in some anti-SLAPP laws. It will then analyze
recent legal developments in three influential states — California, New
York, and Texas — to explore the concept of “public concern” in this
evolving and vital area of law.

II.

PUBLIC CONCERN IN ANTI-SLAPP LAWS

Just one year after Canan and Pring brought SLAPPs to the attention of
the legal world, Washington state passed the nation’s first anti-SLAPP law,
guaranteeing civil immunity to anyone sued for reporting salient information
(e.g., reports of corporate malfeasance) to a government agency.9 The new
law promised just one form of relief for prevailing SLAPP defendants: costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees spent in their legal defense.10
Since then, 31 states, as well as the District of Columbia, have passed
anti-SLAPP laws,11 and 74 percent of Americans currently live in a state with

9. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.500.
10. Id.
11. Those states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. (Both Washington and Minnesota’s laws
were ruled unconstitutional in 2015 and 2016, respectively; although Washington has since passed a new
one.) Austin Vining & Sarah Matthews, Overview of Anti-SLAPP Laws, Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-anti-slapp-guide/. In addition, West Virginia,
although lacking an anti-SLAPP statute, provides some protections through court doctrine. Harris v.
Atkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W.Va. 1993).
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at least some anti-SLAPP protections.12 The primary goal of these laws is to
help qualified defendants mitigate the misery and financial stress that comes
from simply being sued, even if they could ultimately prevail. Indeed, as
originally conceived, anti-SLAPP statutes were intended to ensure that all
citizens could be active participants in government, which meant
“protect[ing] citizens from David and Goliath power differences.”13 SLAPPs
might be without legal merit, but the sheer cost of defending them punishes
critics and tends to intimidate others who might otherwise speak out as well.
Anti-SLAPP laws are thus designed to stop the punitive litigation in its
tracks, give the defendant a chance to obtain an early dismissal before a
lengthy trial process drains their resources, and force plaintiffs to pay costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees if the defendant prevails. To this end, many
of today’s statutes offer SLAPP defendants up to five common forms of
relief:
(1) a vehicle by which defendants can file an expedited motion to
dismiss immediately
(2) a (sometimes automatic) stay of discovery while the motion to
dismiss proceeds
(3) a requirement that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case for the
action
(4) costs and reasonable attorney’s fees (and occasionally potential
damages) if defendants prevail in their anti-SLAPP motion
(5) interlocutory appeal if the motion to dismiss is denied
In May 2021, six years after watching its modernized anti-SLAPP law14
get struck down as unconstitutional,15 Washington passed a new statute
based on a model law produced by the Uniform Law Commission. 16 Noting
the growing consensus in state legislatures that “narrow anti-SLAPP laws
12. The exact percentage is 74.18%, based on the 2020 Census population percentages of the 31
states (and District of Columbia) with operational anti-SLAPP laws.
13. Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D. Mass. 2003).
14. See Michael Eric Johnston, A Better Slapp Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory
Protection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” 38 GONZ. L. REV. 263
(2002-2003) (arguing that the new statute, while still lacking two provisions, is a marked improvement
over the original).
15. See Davis v. Cox, 183 Wash. 2d 269 (Wash. 2015) (ruling that Washington’s summary judgment
process violated the right of trial by jury under the state’s constitution).
16. See
Public
Expression
Protection
Act,
Uniform
Law
Commission,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=4f486460-199c-49d79fac-05570be1e7b1.
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are ineffectual in curbing the many forms of abusive [anti-SLAPP]
litigation,” the ULC crafted a model that hews closely to today’s most
generous anti-SLAPP laws. Washington’s new statute, for instance, includes
all five remedies for defendants.17 And definitionally, it permits a broad
swath of expression by covering lawsuits based on the “(e)xercise of the right
of freedom of speech or of the press . . . on a matter of public concern.”18
There is, in fact, significant variation in how anti-SLAPP statutes have
defined “public concern.” Examining the scope of all 32 anti-SLAPP laws,
a loose taxonomy emerges:
A. PETITION STATUTES
Eleven anti-SLAPP laws still limit the activity they cover to narrow
categories of petitioning,19 speaking at government proceedings20 or
applying to permits from the government.21 Pennsylvania’s, for instance, can
only be used for defendants sued for petitioning related to environmental
policies.22 Nebraska23 and Delaware24 (and New York,25 until last year) have
laws that can only be used by individuals sued in the process of applying for
permits or entitlements from the state. Not surprisingly, these anti-SLAPP
statutes laws don’t see much action.
B. PUBLIC CONCERN “LAUNDRY-LIST” STATUTES
Oklahoma, Connecticut, Kansas, Tennessee, the District of Columbia
(and Texas,26 until 2019) have taken the “laundry list” approach to defining
what’s included in “a matter of public interest.” Moreover, they largely
include the same five categories. “Public issue or issue of public interest” in
Kansas, for instance, “includes an issue related to: (A) health or safety; (B)
environmental, economic or community well-being; (C) the government; (D)
a public official or public figure; or (E) a good, product or service in the
marketplace.”27 The only notable variations are Tennessee and Connecticut’s

17. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.105.020-90.
18. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.105.010(2)(c).
19. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-751 (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (2020); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403(1) (2019); and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2019).
20. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528(1) (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2020); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 634F-1 (2020).
21. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,242 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136 (2020).
22. 27 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301–03 (2020).
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,242 (2020).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136 (2020).
25. Before November 10, 2020, New York’s law only covered individuals who had “applied for or
obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to
act from any government body, or any person with an interest, connection or affiliation with such person
that is materially related to such application or permission.” N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 76-A § 1(b).
26. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. Code § 27.001 (7) (2011).
27. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(c)(7) (2020).
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inclusion of public issues related to “an audiovisual work”28 and Tennessee’s
final category of “any other matter deemed by a court to involve a matter of
public concern.”29 Until 2019, Texas also utilized the laundry-list approach
to its anti-SLAPP statute, but as this work will explore, it has since replaced
it with something of a hybrid definition.
C. ADDITIVE PUBLIC-CONCERN STATUTES
The second approach to incorporating public concern into anti-SLAPP
laws has been to add it onto the petition-era lists defining the statute’s scope.
The California statute’s wording is typical, stating that any “act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech … in connection
with a public issue includes:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive or judicial proceeding;
(2) statements made in connection with an issue under consideration
by a governmental body;
(3) statements made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest;
(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.30
The first two items are typical in older petition statutes. The second two
broaden the scope to any expression “in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest.” Twelve states31 use some variation of this 4-part list
that sets up, at least potentially, a fairly broad scope of public concern.
Another two have versions that appear more limited.32

28. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-17-103(6)(F) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-196a(1)(E) (2018).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-17-104(a) (2020).
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (2019).
31. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.105.010(2); OR. REV.
STAT. Ann. § 31.150(2) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.637; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-1101(2)(a) (2021);
IND. CODE § 34-7-7-2 (2021); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(A)(1) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 911-11.1(c) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2(A) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5807(c) (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041(a) (2019).
32. Arkansas has retained the first two petition categories, and added “including but not limited to”
in front of them. (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-503(1) (2019)). Florida’s law defines “free speech in
connection with public issues” as “any written or oral statement that is protected under applicable law
and is made before a governmental entity in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
governmental entity, or is made in or in connection with a play, movie, television program, radio
broadcast, audiovisual work, book, magazine article, musical work, news report, or other similar work.”
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(2)(a) (2021).
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Although the additive statutes are, at first blush, broader than the
laundry-list statutes, the latter do at least provide definitional guidance via
categories. The additive statutes, on the other hand, beg the question: what
exactly constitutes an issue of public concern? Some statutes include
additional guidance to construe the statute “broadly” or “reasonably,” but
ultimately the work of identifying public-concern speech is left to the courts.

III. PUBLIC CONCERN IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
One route for states attempting to determine whether an issue is “a
matter of public concern” in anti-SLAPP law has been to draw from First
Amendment cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has examined that same
question.33 This section will examine six cases in the Court’s “public
concern” jurisprudence. Although they come from a variety of areas —
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the free-speech
rights of public employees — all six cases have required the Court to wrestle
with whether the speech in question constituted a matter of public concern.
Three cases have, together, yielded a definition of public concern and an
analytical framework for determining whether something is indeed a matter
of public concern that, for better or worse, has found its way into state antiSLAPP law.
A. THE PROBLEMATIC PICKERING-CONNICK TEST
The Court’s public-concern jurisprudence was initially formulated,
rather messily, in two cases examining the First Amendment rights of public
employees. In the first case, Pickering v. Board of Education, 34 school
teacher Marvin Pickering argued that his First Amendment rights were
violated when the Board of Education fired him for sending a letter to a
newspaper that was critical of a bond issue it wanted voters to pass. Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, balked at the notion that public employees
would be summarily “compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
interest,” but concluded that it was still necessary to balance “the conflicting
claims of First Amendment protection and the need for orderly school
administration.”35 Justice Marshall’s balancing analysis examined the
strength of each side, and was itself an explication of private and public
spheres. The state’s argument was weakened, he wrote, because the School
Board produced no evidence that Pickering’s letter caused any workplace
33. As a Harvard Law Review commentary put it: “The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the
First Amendment protects an individual’s ability to speak on matters of public import, even if the speech
is profoundly controversial and hurtful. In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern receives
considerably less First Amendment protection.” Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 192, 192 (2011).
34. 391 U.S. 563, 564-66 (1968).
35. Id. at 569.
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(private sphere) disorder. Indeed, the letter never alluded to any individuals
that he worked with directly, and thus posed little threat of disrupting
operations at his own school. Moreover, Pickering’s letter, addressing the
question of whether the school system required additional funds (public
sphere), was precisely the type of issue on which citizens — especially
teachers — should speak out. “On such a question,” Marshall declared, “free
and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.”36
In Connick v. Myers,37 however, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, arrived at
the opposite conclusion. Here, the Court considered the firing of a New
Orleans assistant prosecutor after she resisted a job transfer, citing a conflict
of interest,38 then circulated a questionnaire to other employees about office
transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level
of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work
on political campaigns supported by the DA’s office.39 Citing Pickering,
Justice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that Sheila Myers’ speech
could only be protected under the First Amendment if it was “a matter of
legitimate public concern.”40 Reversing both the District and Circuit court
rulings, the Court determined that it was not.
In Connick, Justice White penned what would come to be used as a
definition of public concern: expression that can “be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”41 He also announced a three-factor test, stating that the
question of public concern “must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement.”42 He then proceeded to embark on a lengthy
and abstruse analysis. In Myers’ case, he concluded, all but one of the topics
(the “content”) in her questionnaire consisted of questions that did “not fall
under the rubric of public concern.”43 In terms of “context,” Justice White
concluded that Myers’ questionnaire, was not circulated “out of purely
academic interest, … so as to obtain useful information” 44 and, not
coincidentally, took place after she resisted her transfer, suggesting it was
inspired by a private grievance.
36. Id. at 571-572 (1968)
37. 461 U.S. 138, 139 (1983).
38. “Myers’ opposition was at least partially attributable to her concern that a conflict of interest
would have been created by the transfer because of her participation in a counseling program for
convicted defendants released on probation in the section of the criminal court to which she was to be
assigned.” Id. at 140 n.1.
39. Id. at 141.
40. Id. at 145 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-572).
41. Id. at 146. The full quote is: “When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment.”
42. Id. at 147-148.
43. Id. at 148.
44. Id. at 153.
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One problematic factor in White’s trio — “form,” framed here as “the
manner, time, and place in which the questionnaire was distributed”45 — was
murky in both its application and significance. Here, Justice White reported
that the questionnaire was prepared and distributed at the workplace, and
required not only Myers “to leave her work, but for others to do the same in
order that the questionnaire be completed.”46 Logically, how “form” evokes
this particular detail is certainly not intuitive. 47 And Justice White’s analysis
was even more mystifying. The Court concluded that the time employees
spent answering the questionnaires “supports Connick’s fears that the
functioning of his office was endangered.”48 The assertion that 14 assistant
prosecutors, setting aside work for what was likely 15-30 minutes,
“endangered the functioning of [the DA’s] office,” is dubious at best.
Justice Brennan’s dissent challenged the three-factor test overall, as
well as the Court’s analysis of the questionnaire’s content. First, Justice
Brennan cited the strange disconnect between the Court’s elaborate threefactor analysis and Justice White’s comment, while distinguishing Connick
from another case, that it was “clear” a school district’s racially
discriminatory policies were a matter of public concern — suggesting that
perhaps a three-factor analysis was only sometimes necessary.49 The
dissenters also took issue with the majority’s conclusion that efficiency and
morale in an elected DA’s office was not a matter of public concern. This
assertion wasn’t supported by the facts: Internal operations of that DA’s
office “often receive[d] extensive coverage in New Orleans’ daily paper. In
fact, as soon as the district court took up the case, the newspaper carried a
seven-paragraph story describing the questionnaire and the events leading to
Myers’ dismissal; and it continued its coverage as the case made its way to
the Supreme Court.50
Ultimately, if Connick illustrates anything, it is that White’s ‘content,
form, context’ framework has questionable utility as a meaningful or
predictive analytical tool. Two lower courts, relying on Pickering, had
arrived at a wholly different conclusion. So did four of the nine Supreme
Court justices, including Justice Brennan, who wrote the dissenting opinion,
and Justice Marshall, who wrote the Pickering opinion that Connick was
ostensibly following.
45. Id. at 152.
46. Id. at 153. Presumably, Justice White meant that Myers and her colleagues had to briefly stop
what they were doing to fill out the questionnaire.
47. The purpose of the “form” inquiry is indeed mystifying. Neither Connick nor Snyder used the
term itself, or subheadings, to clarify its presence in the analysis. Even experts in First Amendment
jurisprudence have had to guess at a functional use of the term. See Calvert, supra note 7, at 58 (suggesting
that it could be alluding to the type of media used by the speaker).
48. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153.
49. Id. at 159. The case White was distinguishing was Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
50. Id. at 160 n.2.
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B. “PUBLIC CONCERN” IN DEFAMATION LAW: PLURALITY CHAOS
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 51 The Supreme Court evoked
public concern a number of times in its opinion, including Justice Brennan’s
famous declaration of the Sullivan standard’s ultimate goal: that “debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”52 But the
Sullivan actual-malice standard itself focused on the identity of the plaintiff
rather than the content of the alleged defamation. Initially targeting public
officials, it was then expanded to include public figures, who command
“sufficient continuing public interest” and have “sufficient access to the
means of counterargument” that private individuals do not.53
Then, in 1971’s Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc,54 a plurality of the
Court extended the Sullivan standard to private-figure plaintiffs when the
speech in question involved matters of public import. Here, a Philadelphia
radio station, covering a city-wide crackdown on “smut merchants,”
reported the arrest of George Rosenbloom after police raided several
properties and found “allegedly obscene books” as well as “obscene books”
— failing, in short, to consistently include the qualifiers “reportedly” or
“allegedly.” Sullivan’s architect, Justice Brennan, revisiting his great work,
argued that limiting Sullivan to a class of plaintiffs had ultimately missed the
mark. “It is clear,” he wrote in Rosenbloom, that “the First Amendment’s
impact upon state libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff
is a ‘public official,’ ‘public figure,’ or ‘private individual,’ as it derives from
the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter
of public or general interest.” With this insight, the Court would now extend
constitutional protection “to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons
involved are famous or anonymous.”55
Rosenbloom marked a dramatic expansion of free-expression rights —
but it was short-lived. Just three years later, the Court rejected the doctrine
in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.,56 further delineating the “public” and
“private” categories of libel plaintiffs and limiting — again — the actual
malice requirement to the former.57
As a separate matter, Justice Powell, writing for the Gertz Court also
limited the state’s ability to award presumed and punitive damages unless
the defamation plaintiff could prove actual malice.58 Nine years later, in Dun
51. 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
52. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
53. Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
54. 403 U.S. 29, 54 (1971).
55. Id. at 43-44. Interestingly, Justice Marshall dissented in Rosenbloom and offered an early
warning of the ambiguity inherent in the public concern standard. Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
57. Id. at 345-348.
58. Id. at 348-350.
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& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court continued its
defamation revisions by reaching for the public concern standard yet again
— this time to adjust its Gertz damages rule.59 In this case, a credit agency,
Dun & Bradstreet, erroneously claimed that Greenmoss Builders had filed
for bankruptcy in a report sent to five subscribers, including Greenmoss’
bank. Although the credit agency issued a corrective notice a week later,
Greenmoss sued for defamation, and was awarded presumptive and punitive
damages even though there was no showing of actual malice.
Justice Powell, who had spent a dozen pages in the Gertz opinion
bemoaning the lack of consensus in Rosenbloom, was now writing for a
plurality of three as he revived the public concern factor for use in
defamation damages.60 Although Gertz had created a prohibition on
presumptive and punitive damages sans a showing of actual malice, Justice
Powell claimed that prohibition had been limited to cases in which the
alleged defamation pertained to a matter of public concern.61 Now the Court
had to determine whether the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet qualified for
that status.62
One of Justice Powell’s chief objections to Rosenbloom was the
“unpredictable results and uncertain expectations” that would accompany a
case-by-case analysis of the public concern issue.63 Supervising ad hoc
resolutions across the nation’s courts was indeed “not feasible.”64 It was
perhaps with great reluctance, then, that he plucked the “content, form and
context” inquiry from Connick v. Snyder to be used for this and future lowercourt decisions. Indeed, Justice Powell made short work of the public
concern issue, dutifully citing Connick’s three-factor test, then simply
holding that “these factors indicate that petitioner’s credit report concerns no
public issue. It was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience.”65 He further noted that Dun & Bradstreet’s
subscription agreement required that the information remain confidential
with its subscribers, thus limiting the reach of any information contained in
the reports. The Court thus concluded that the case in no way implicated the

59. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
60. Justice Powell was joined by Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor. Justice Brennan again
dissented, joined by the other Connick dissenters: Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice
Stevens.
61. 472 U.S. 749, 51 (1985). “In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,” Powell wrote, “we held that the First
Amendment restricted the damages that a private individual could obtain from a publisher for a libel that
involved a matter of public concern.”
62. Id.
63. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
64. Id.
65. 472 U.S. at 762. Justice Powel cited Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-772 (1976), presumably to indicate that the credit report constituted
commercial speech.
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Sullivan First Amendment concern for “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”
debate on public matters and thus did not require states to impose an elevated
fault standard.66
C. THE CONNICK-SNYDER “SYNTHESIS”
Twenty-five years later, in Snyder v. Phelps,67 the Court reached back
to Connick’s public-concern framework to determine whether the leader of
the Westboro Baptist Church could claim First Amendment protection for
organizing a protest with hate-spewing slogans near the funeral of Marine
Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, a soldier killed in the Iraq war. Armed with
protest placards expressing anti-Catholic and homophobic spite (‘Thank God
for IEDs,’ Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ ‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape Boy,’
‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’), Fred
Phelps, Sr. and his church made a regular practice of picketing military
funerals. Their placards reflected the church’s bizarre theology of a “militant
homosexual movement” exposing America to the wrath of God and bringing
the nation closer each day to the ignominious fate of Sodom and Gomorrah.68
After the funeral, Matthew Snyder’s father, Albert Snyder, sued Phelps and
the church for intentional infliction of emotional distress.69 At trial, the jury
awarded Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in
punitive damages. The Fourth Circuit reversed.70
The Supreme Court had considered the infliction of emotional distress
tort once before, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.71 There, the Court had
focused on the “public figure” status of televangelist Jerry Falwell, declaring
that such plaintiffs should face the same actual-malice standard they did in
bringing defamation claims.72 In Snyder, however, the Court largely ignored
this dimension, declining to either explicitly embrace or reject Falwell.
Instead, it focused on analyzing whether or not the Westboro speech
addressed a matter of public concern — which the Court, without citation,
now assumed as the boundary of protected speech vis-à-vis the infliction
tort.73 In Falwell, the public figure finding led to a further actual malice
requirement for the plaintiff; Snyder, on the other hand, simply declared, ipse
dixit, that the analysis was over once public-concern speech is identified —
there was no heightened fault burden for the plaintiff, no application of First

66. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
67. 562 U.S. 443 (2010).
68. About
Us,
WESTBORO
BAPTIST
CHURCH,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html.
69. 562 U.S. at 450.
70. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d. 206, 206 (4th Cir. 2009).
71. 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988).
72. Id. at 56.
73. As the Snyder Court put it, “restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the
same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest.” 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2010).
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Amendment scrutiny (strict or otherwise), nor any other of the standard
impedimenta of the Court’s free speech toolkit.
At the outset of his public concern analysis, Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court, candidly admitted that “the boundaries of the public
concern test are not well defined.”74 Attempting to further clarify that test,
he expanded Connick’s definition: “Speech deals with matters of public
concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject
of legitimate news interest, that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and concern to the public.’”75 Roberts contrasted such matters of public
import with the facts of Dun & Bradstreet.
Next, the Chief Justice attempted to administer the three-factor Connick
analysis: In terms of content, the church’s signs clearly addressed a matter
of public concern. Even if the messages fell short of “refined social or
political commentary,” Roberts wrote, “the issues they highlight — the
political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of
our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the
Catholic clergy — are matters of public import.” For the “form,” Justice
Roberts, clearly caged in by Connick’s superfluous edifice, addressed the
“context” of Westboro’s expression, noting that Wesboro’s protest was
designed “to reach as broad a public audience as possible.” Albert Snyder
had attempted to persuade the Court that picketing at his son’s funeral
converted the speech from public to private, but the Court disagreed, noting
that even if several signs could be interpreted as addressed specifically to the
Snyder family (“You’re Going to Hell”), “the overall thrust and dominant
theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”76
Although eight justices were convinced the Westboro signs conveyed
speech on matters of public concern and should thus be protected, Justice
Samuel Alito’s dissent challenged that notion. Justice Alito argued that the
Westboro signs expressed a mixture of both broader societal concerns and
vicious personal attacks on the Snyder family.77 The dissent rejected the
“overall thrust and dominant theme” approach of the majority, which
immunized the entirety of the church’s speech because parts of it were
addressed to public issues. Analogizing the case to libel, Alito pointed out
that “the First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that
are interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public
concern, and there is no good reason why respondents’ attack on Matthew
Snyder and his family should be treated differently.”78 This is of course a
74. 562 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added) (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)).
75. Id. at 453 (quoting 543 U.S. at 84).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 471 (Alito, J., dissenting). The personal nature of the attacks was further demonstrated by
an online post (the “epic”) made by the church, which the Court did not consider in this case. Id. at 470.
78. Id. at 471 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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valid point — where actionable speech is presented alongside nonactionable
speech, the latter shouldn’t necessarily immunize the former. At the very
least, this juxtaposition issue may call on future courts to unpack more fully
the merits of lumping versus splitting speech in the public concern analysis.
As even the Snyder majority acknowledged, delimiting the public
concern concept is challenging. The majority’s largely tautological
definition of public-concern speech certainly raises questions. Moreover, its
insistence on Connick’s fact-intensive — yet murky — three-factor
framework adds significant legal uncertainty for future speakers.79 This
brand of essentially ad hoc, case-specific analysis can create an
unpredictable free speech environment. As one commentator put it, “these
principles do little more than restate the proposition that the First
Amendment protects speech regarding a matter of public concern, and they
will likely provide little guidance, especially in close cases.”80

IV. CLASH OF THE TITANS: CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, AND TEXAS
CHART NEW PATHS
In the last three years, California, New York, and Texas — three of the
largest states in population — have significantly adjusted their approaches
to the public/private question in their respective anti-SLAPP laws: California
by court decision, and New York and Texas through legislative amendment.
This potential sea change has profound implications for the availability of
anti-SLAPP relief both in these states and in other states influenced by their
anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.
California, long known for its defendant-friendly interpretation of
public matters, began reining in that approach in cases decided by the state’s
high court in 2019. Texas, on the other hand, amended its statute in 2019 in
a manner that appears to have both narrowed, and in some ways, expanded
the reach of its anti-SLAPP law. On the other hand, New York, long known
for an extremely limited anti-SLAPP statute, produced an amended law in
2020 that dramatically expanded its coverage. This section will examine
each state’s approach to the public concern issue and explore its effects on
the availability of anti-SLAPP relief for defendants.
A. CALIFORNIA: THE “CATCHALL PROVISION”
As discussed above, California’s anti-SLAPP statute — like those of 11
other states — covers the two classic “petition” activities, then adds
expression (3) “made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
79. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Know Your Audience: Risky Speech at the Intersection of
Meaning and Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 141, 178-182
(2014/2015).
80. Andrew Meerkins, Note, Distressing Speech After Snyder — What’s Left of IIED?, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 999, 1023 (2013).
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connection with an issue of public interest” or (4) “any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest. 81 This final subsection has been referred to as the
“catchall provision.”
The “public interest” requirement was for many years interpreted with
great liberality. Although there was some variation among California courts,
many were willing expand the concept to its seeming limit. 82 In one wellknown ruling, a dispute among cat breeders “concerned matters of public
interest in the cat breeding community.”83 Also labeled a matter of public
interest was a dispute between PTA members and a 4 th grade basketball
coach over his abrasive coaching style.84 Other California courts, however,
have employed a less relaxed approach to the public interest question. For
example, in Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO,85 a state appellate court found that criticism regarding
a custodial staff’s supervisor was “hardly a matter of public interest,” even
though it was part of a labor dispute.86 The Rivero court surveyed the existing
California case law and offered three indicia of matters of public concern:
statements that 1) “concerned a person or entity in the public eye,” 2)
“conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct
participants,” or 3) “a topic of widespread, public interest.”87 The Rivero
summary, while a helpful taxonomy, hardly captured a monolithic reality in
California — as noted, other appellate courts sought to construe the statute
as broadly as possible. As one court put it, “the issue need not be significant
to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” It was simply “one in which the
public takes an interest.”88 Indeed, the Rivero court acknowledged the view
that, as with Justice Potter Stewart and obscenity,89 “some observers have
said that a ‘public concern’ test amounts to little more than a message to
judges and attorneys that no standards are necessary because they will, or

81. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (e).
82. For an excellent overview of the varying standards applied by California courts, see Felix Shafir
& Jeremey Rosen, What is ‘Public Interest’ Under California Anti-SLAPP Law?, LAW360 (Dec. 1, 2016,
5:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/868201.
83. Traditional Cat Ass’n , Inc. v. Gilbreath, 13 Cal. App. 392, 397 (2004). See also, Seelig v. Infinity
Broad. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 801 (2002) (holding that discussion of plaintiff’s participation in
television program “Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire” is a matter of public interest). But see
Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1127 (2003) (ruling that allegations of theft of token among
small group of token collectors was not a matter of public concern, but rather a matter of concern to a
small, specific audience).
84. Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization, 203 Cal. App. 4th 450 (2012).
85. 105 Cal. App. 4th 913 (2003).
86. Shafir & Rosen, supra note 82 (quoting Rivero, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 924-925).
87. Rivero, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 924.
88. Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1039-42 (2008). See also, other cases
cited in Shafir & Rosen, supra note 82..
89. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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should, know a public concern when they see it.”90 It was amidst this
doctrinal disarray that the California Supreme Court finally decided to act.
In 2019, the California Supreme Court, in FilmOn.Com, Inc. v.
DoubleVerify, Inc.,91 sought to bring increased clarity and rigor to the public
interest question.92 The case began when FilmOn.com (“FilmOn”), an online
content distributor, sued DoubleVerify, a company providing confidential
“online tracking, verification, and ‘brand safety’ services to Internet
advertisers.”93 DoubleVerify had labeled some of FilmOn’s websites as
containing “Adult Content” or “Copyright Infringement,” which would
presumably make FilmOn’s websites less attractive to advertisers.94
DoubleVerify filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP law,
asserting that its report was a matter of public interest under the catchall
provision. The trial court granted the motion, and a state appellate court
affirmed.95
In explicating the proper scope of matters of public interest under the
statute, the California Supreme Court reversed and held that DoubleVerify’s
report was not in fact issued to further free speech about a matter of public
interest.96 As the high court put it, “we find that DoubleVerify’s reports –
generated for profit, exchanged confidentially without being part of any
attempt to participate in a larger public discussion – do not quality for antiSLAPP protection under the catchall provision, even where the topic
discussed is, broadly speaking, one of public interest.”97 In concluding that
DoubleVerify was ineligible for anti-SLAPP protection, the court outlined a
two-step analysis that first examines the content of the speech in question
and whether it sufficiently implicates a matter of public interest. Next, the
analysis explored the context of the speech to determine “what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about

90. FilmOn.Com, Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 105 Cal. App. 4th 133, 929 (2019) (citations omitted).
91. 7 Cal. 5th 133 (2019). Two other contemporaneous California Supreme Court opinions
emphasize similar themes: Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, 6 Cal. 5th 610 (2019) (contract
dispute over exclusive representation in building of NFL stadium did not sufficiently connect to broader
public issue of whether to have NFL team and build the stadium in California city) and Wilson v. Cable
News Network, Inc., 7 Cal. 5th 871 (2019) (potentially defamatory statements by news organization about
terminating journalist for alleged plagiarism were too tangentially related to broader public issues
inherent in the news story itself or to societal concerns about journalistic ethics).
92. Although FilmOn explicitly addressed only the “catchall provision” of California’s anti-SLAPP
statute, its analysis of matters of public interest will doubtless be extended, mutatis mutandis, to clause 3
as well.
93. 7 Cal. 5th at 140.
94. Id. at 142. FilmOn’s lawsuit alleged trade libel, tortious interference with contract, and related
torts.
95. Id. at 142.
96. Id. at 154-55.
97. Id. at 140.
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some matter of public interest.”98 This “content and context” approach
certainly has echoes of the “content, form, and context” analysis advocated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder and related cases, although the
California high court did not cite that case (or any of the Court’s opinions)
on the public interest determination.
The second part of the analysis — the contextual inquiry — proved fatal
to DoubleVerify’s anti-SLAPP defense. The content of DoubleVerify’s
reports — dealing with adult content online and potential copyright
infringement — might in the abstract ostensibly relate to matters of public,
rather than private, interest, the court stated. However, it was not sufficient
that the statements could be loosely linked to abstract matters of public
interest. Instead, “the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the
public debate.”99 DoubleVerify’s statements, the court held, did not do that.
Although the court left open the precise methodology for determining
whether a statement contributes to general discussion of a matter of public
interest, it noted that California courts must focus on “‘the specific nature of
the speech’ rather than on any ‘generalities that might be abstracted from it.’
Defendants cannot merely offer a ‘synecdoche theory’ of public interest,
defining their narrow dispute by its slight reference to the broader public
issue.”100
FilmOn seems to be having an impact on California public interest
jurisprudence.101 For example, in Woodhill Ventures v. Yang,102 decided in
2021, a California court of appeal relied in part on FilmOn to reject an antiSLAPP motion by the defendant, described by the court as “self-proclaimed
celebrity jeweler Ben ‘the Baller’ Yang.”103 Yang used his significant social
media following to attack Big Sugar Bakeshop after the bakery made a
birthday cake for Yang’s seven-year-old son that included edible frosting
designed to look like medications. The bakery claimed it did not know the
cake was for a child. Yang’s outraged Instagram posts in the wake of this
decoration debacle included declarations like “Welp @bigsugarbakeshop
you fucked up royally and now you guys are legit cancelled,” and “Anyone

98. Id. at 149-150. As the California Supreme Court noted, “the travails of the lower courts
demonstrate that virtually always, defendants succeed in drawing a line – however tenuous – connecting
their speech to an abstract issue of public interest.” Id. at 150.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 152 (quoting Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc., 110 Cal. App.
4th 26, 34 (2003)).
101. In addition to cases discussed in the text, see, e.g., Murray v. Tran, 55 Cal. App. 5th 10 (2020)
(thoroughly analyzing alleged defamatory statements about dentist by another dentist using FilmOn
analysis and citing and analyzing other post-FilmOn decisions, ultimately concluding that most of the
statements did not qualify as matters of public concern); Bernstein v. LaBeouf, 43 Cal. App. 5th 15 (2019)
(holding that the fact that the speaker, celebrity Shia LaBeouf, was himself a public figure did not convert
otherwise private dispute into matter of public concern under anti-SLAPP statute).
102. Woodhill Ventures v. Yang, 68 Cal. App. 5th 624, 626 (2021).
103. Id. at 628.
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in their even high mind would know that you should NEVER PUT DRUGS
ON A 7 year old kids [sic] bday cake!”104 Yang also attacked the bakery on
Twitter and in a podcast.
When Big Sugar sued for libel and related claims, Yang moved to strike
under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding that
the statements in question did not address a matter of public interest. A state
appellate court upheld that determination. Among other arguments, Yang
contended that his statements implicated a matter of public interest since the
CDC and American Academy of Pediatrics had warned about the dangers of
“‘candy confusion,’ or children mistakenly eating pills they believe are
candy.”105 The court of appeals was unimpressed with the conflation of
Yang’s posts and the candy confusion issue. As the court put it: “Agile
thinkers can always create some kind of link between a statement and an
issue of public concern. All you need is a fondness for abstraction and a
knowledge of popular culture.”106 The court explicitly cited FilmOn for the
proposition that such a “tangential relationship is not enough.”107
Another recent California case relying on FilmOn also demonstrates the
power of that decision in constraining the scope of California’s statute. Block
v. Bramzon108 addressed a dispute between rival law firms that took the
opposite sides in eviction cases in Los Angeles. Dennis P. Block, a lawyer
who represented landlords, sued BASTA, a law firm that defends tenants in
such cases, for defamation after BASTA created a Twitter parody account
called “Not Dennis Block” that tweeted statements ostensibly made by
Block, but which actually attacked Block and employees of his firm. Among
other things, the tweets suggested Block was “a greedy thief and criminal,
unethical and immoral, racist, sexist, … unfaithful and promiscuous.” 109 At
trial, the judge found that the tweets fell within the scope of the anti-SLAPP
law since they “involved ‘a consumer watchdog type of situation.’”110
However, the court of appeals, following FilmOn, reversed, in an
unpublished opinion. BASTA, on appeal, had argued that Dennis Block had
made himself a public issue by conceding he was “‘a person in the public
eye’ and ‘generally regarded as one of the pre-eminent attorneys handling
landlord-tenant matters.’”111 Even if that were true, the court noted, the

104. Id.
105. Id. at 632.
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. Block v. Bramazon, 2021 WL 223154, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2021).
109. Id. at *2. In an appendix to its opinion, the court included 92 tweets from the Not Dennis Block
account.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *4. BASTA also argued that Block had been profiled on the front page of the Los Angeles
Times some ten years before. The court of appeals expressed skepticism about whether the decade-old
newspaper profile or Block’s other activities (which the court characterized as “marketing activities [that]
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speech in question would still have to meet the public issue requirement. In
its analysis, the court explicitly followed the analytical framework created in
FilmOn. As to whether the defendant’s Twitter statements about Block (the
“content”) implicated a public issue, the court conceded that “the public is
definitely interested in critical issues related to housing, including the
shortage of affordable housing, gentrification, rising rents, and rent
control.”112 The court, however, found that BASTA’s tweets didn’t directly
reference these topics. They simply attributed various outrageous statements
to Block.113 This kind of mock assertion, the court found, was too
tangentially related to any genuine issue of public interest. Rather than, for
example, assisting consumers in identifying trustworthy legal representation,
the statements by BASTA were merely insulting. The court pointed out that
“hold[ing] otherwise would turn every insult of a businessperson into a
‘consumer protection’ matter subject to anti-SLAPP protection.”114
In the contextual part of the FilmOn analysis, the court ruled that even
if the defendants had been able to identify a public issue in the first part of
the analysis, the Twitter statements wouldn’t have contributed to public
debate about that issue. The court suggested that rather than advancing public
debate of any sort, the Twitter account was solely used to “slam Block –
BASTA’s frequent adversary.”115 The defendants argued the account was a
parody that no reasonable person would have taken literally, but the court
seemed to suggest that very fact meant it therefore couldn’t meaningfully
contribute to public debate on “Block’s ‘trustworthiness,’ the housing crisis,
or any other plausible public issue.”116 Disturbingly, this analysis appears to
suggest that parody and rhetorical hyperbole cannot have a serious role in
galvanizing public debate, although the court’s finding that there was no
public issue in the “content” portion of its analysis seems to render this
portion of the opinion somewhat superfluous. The court also rejected
BASTA’s contention that republishing negative online reviews of Block
contributed to consumer information about him and his firm. As the court
put it: “Sprinkling in some negative Yelp reviews cannot insulate unrelated
actionable statements. This is not the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute.”117
The California high court’s tightening of the nexus between specific
statements and matters of public interest in FilmOn appears to be having an
impact. While the statutory language has not been changed, its interpretation

are not that uncommon among attorneys” ), necessarily rendered him a person in the public eye for antiSLAPP purposes (seemingly a synonym for the “public figure” category in defamation law). Id.
112. Id. at *5.
113. Id. One of the tweets, for example, stated that “Dennis Block and Associates is helping to
#MAGA [Make America Great Again] by evicting one latino at a time.” Id.
114. Id. at *6.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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by California courts certainly appears to have been altered from the statute’s
free-wheeling past.
B. TEXAS: “A SUBJECT OF CONCERN TO THE PUBLIC”
While FilmOn and related cases clearly heralded a heightened standard
for matters of public interest in California, Texas’s revision of its antiSLAPP law was a less obvious recasting. Certainly there was no question
that the Texas Legislature sought in its 2019 amendments to rein in its antiSLAPP law. Many argued that state’s original statute — the Texas Citizens
Participation Act (TCPA) of 2011 — had wreaked havoc in the state’s courts,
“clogging the dockets of trial and appellate courts with expensive,
complicated, and time-consuming litigation.”118 Indeed, “at one point in
2018, roughly 40 percent of the entire docket in the Dallas Court of Appeals
consisted of TCPA cases.”119 Nevertheless, the newly amended Texas statute
also expanded the law by creating at least one category of cases involving
the media in which there is, astonishingly, no public interest requirement at
all.
Prior to the revision, the 2011 TCPA was a laundry-list statute,
categorizing matters of public concern exactly as Oklahoma, Kansas, and the
District of Columbia have: “(A) health or safety; (B) environmental,
economic, or community well-being; (C) the government; (D) a public
official or public figure; or (E) a good, product, or service in the
marketplace.”120 Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court had held that the 2011
TCPA was to be interpreted broadly, and that even a tangential relationship
between the communication and the public concern categories was enough
to trigger the statute’s protection.
For example, in 2015’s ExxonMobil Pipeline Company v. Coleman121
the Texas high court considered a defamation suit by Travis Coleman, a
former employee of ExxonMobil, who claimed the company had fired him
after falsely claiming he hadn’t properly reported fluid levels in tanks that
contained potentially dangerous petroleum products. The allegations against
Coleman were made on several report forms shared within the business, and
in statements to an internal investigator. A lower court had ruled the antiSLAPP statute didn’t apply, as the statements about Coleman “had only a
tangential relationship to health, safety, environmental, and economic
concerns” (all included in the 2011 statute’s “laundry list”) and were strictly
about a personnel matter within the company.122 The Texas Supreme Court

118. Mark C. Walker, The Essential Guide to the Texas Anti-SLAPP Law, the Texas Defamation
Mitigation Act, and Rule 91A, State Bar of Texas 36th Annual Litigation Update Institute at 1 (2020).
119. Id.
120. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001 (7) (2011).
121. 512 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2017).
122. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 464 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. 2015).
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rejected this interpretation, instead concluding that “the statements, although
private and among EMPCo employees, related to a ‘matter of public
concern’ because they concerned Coleman’s alleged failure to gauge tank
7840, a process completed, at least in part, to reduce the potential
environmental, health, safety, and economic risks associated with noxious
and flammable chemicals overfilling and spilling onto the ground.”123 The
state high court’s interpretation of the prior statute was thus a breathtakingly
broad one that, as it noted, “does not require that the statements specifically
‘mention’ health, safety, environmental, or economic concerns, nor does it
require more than a ‘tangential relationship’ to the same….” 124
The 2019 Texas revision replaced the statute’s laundry list with a
wholly unique “matter of public concern” definition, which includes
statements or activities regarding:
(A) a public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn
substantial public attention due to the person’s official acts, fame,
notoriety, or celebrity;
(B) a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or
(C) subject of concern to the public.125
The first category — speech about a public official or public figure —
is the only survivor from the statute’s 2011 laundry list, and has been
augmented with an “other person” category, perhaps meant to broaden the
scope of what constitutes a public figure beyond the Gertz constitutional
definition. The second and third categories are borrowed from Chief Justice
Roberts’ Connick/Snyder formulation,126 and their aim is to narrow the scope
of the statute and implement what one scholarly analysis called “the most
significant amendment made by the 2019 TCPA legislation.” 127 However,
what exactly the language means (and whether the Texas statute’s standards
are largely coextensive with First Amendment concepts) is unclear. One
Texas commentator with significant expertise in the TCPA gave voice to the
uncertainly created by the legislature’s importation of Connick/Snyder as
follows: “What on earth is ‘a subject of concern to the public?’”128
123. 512 S.W.3d at 901.
124. Id. at 900. For another extremely broad decision under the prior statute, see Lippincott v.
Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015) (private emails sent within medical facility questioning
practices and behavior of nurse anesthetist were made in connection with a matter of public concern).
125. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7)(A)–(C).
126. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011).
127. Amy Bresnen, Lisa Kaufman & Steve Bresnen, Targeting the Texas Citizen Participation Act:
The 2019 Texas Legislature’s Amendments to a Most Consequential Law, 52 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 27
(2020).
128. Walker, supra note 118, at 18.
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There are, as yet, relatively few Texas cases applying the new statute
— most appellate cases reported at this writing were filed before the
amendments went into effect and thus apply the old statute. Thus far, it
appears that the new “matter of public concern” definition has prompted
courts to be more attuned to the public nature of the speech. For example, in
Chesser v. Aucoin,129 a Texas court of appeals considered an anti-SLAPP
motion in a case involving a loan to help launch a cybersecurity business.
Although the movant argued that cybersecurity was a matter of public
concern, the court disagreed, saying the trial court had properly dismissed
the TCPA motion. In its analysis, the appeals court specifically cited the
2019 amendments, reasoning that “the current definition of ‘matter of public
concern’ emphasizes the term’s public component….” 130 The court
ultimately concluded that the cybersecurity transaction was a purely private
matter.131
Notably, the new Texas statute departs significantly from the customary
public concern requirement when it comes to the media. It contains a number
of explicit exemptions —situations in which the statute is simply not
operative — such as attorney disciplinary proceedings and common law
fraud actions. Notwithstanding these exemptions, the Texas Legislature gave
the media an “exemption from the exemptions” that applies not just to
journalistic works, but to films, literary works and a variety of other
expressive works, as well as to consumer reviews.132 These items are
protected “whether public or private,” which is, of course, a dramatic
departure from the anti-SLAPP canon. The media exemption allows many,
if not all, media defendants to avoid the minefield of the public/private

129. 2020 WL 7391711, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2020).
130. Id. at *4.
131. Id. See also, e.g., Yu v. Koo, 2021 WL 4166727 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2021) (in case involving
defamation by ex-employee after employee reported sexual assault by employer, court found statements
regarding commission of crimes is clearly within amended TCPA’s public concern definition; however,
statements about wrongful termination of employee, which would have been covered by previous version
of TCPA, no longer are. Id. at *5.).
132. (b) Notwithstanding Subsections (a)(2), (7), and (12), this chapter applies to:
(1) a legal action against a person arising from any act of that person, whether public or private,
related to the gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of information for communication to the public,
whether or not the information is actually communicated to the public, for the creation, dissemination,
exhibition, or advertisement or other similar promotion of a dramatic, literary, musical, political,
journalistic, or otherwise artistic work, including audio-visual work regardless of the means of
distribution, a motion picture, a television or radio program, or an article published in a newspaper,
website, magazine, or other platform, no matter the method or extent of distribution; and
(2) a legal action against a person related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or
processing of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or
ratings of businesses.132.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010 (emphasis added).
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distinction — an invaluable statutory gift for such defendants.133 As TCPA
expert Mark C. Walker put it, the exemption seems to provide “the strongest,
most explicit media protections in the United States.”134
C. NEW YORK: “AN ISSUE OF PUBLIC INTEREST”
It is something of a mystery how the world’s media capital135 took so
long to pass a strong anti-SLAPP law, but New York finally did so on
November 10, 2020. Earlier that year, when the state legislature passed the
bill, its sponsor, Senator Brad Hoylman, dropped two names that may very
well have energized the push for a new law: “For decades,” Hoylman
tweeted, “powerful men like Donald Trump & Harvey Weinstein have
abused our justice system to silence, intimidate, and impoverish their critics
with frivolous lawsuits known as SLAPPs. Today New York slaps back.”136
New York did, of course, have an anti-SLAPP law for more than 25
years, but it applied only to petitioning situations involving public permits,
zoning matters, and the like. To expand its old petition-based statute, New
York left alone the original “action involving public petition and
participation”137 language, but gave it a completely new two-part definition,
encompassing:
(1) any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum
in connection with an issue of public interest; or 138
(2) any other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of
public interest, or in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of petition.139
And to ensure that one of the most notoriously narrow anti-SLAPP laws
became one of the broadest, the statute instructs courts to construe “public
interest” broadly to mean “any subject other than a purely private matter.”140
Moreover, the amended statute requires that all plaintiffs whose suits fall

133. See Laura Lee Prather & Robert T. Sherwin, The Changing Landscape of the Texas Citizens
Participation Act, 52 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 163, 172 (2020) (“[N]one of the claims arising out of these
communications have to be related to matters of public concern.”).
134. Walker, supra note 118, at 26.
135. Felix Richter, New York Is The World’s Media Capital, STATISTA (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.statista.com/chart/3299/new-york-is-the-worlds-media-capital/.
136. Senator Brad Hoylman (@bradhoylman), Twitter (July 22, 2020, 10:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/bradhoylman/status/1285997594611724290.
137. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (1(a)).
138. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (1(a)(1)).
139. Id. at § 1(a)(2).
140. Id. at § 1(d).
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under the anti-SLAPP umbrella prove actual malice in order to recover
damages.141
Given that its passage was just a year ago, there is a surprising amount
of case law applying it already. This is largely because the New York
Legislature directed amendments to “take effect immediately” as a corrective
measure, and the courts — starting with District Judge Jed S. Rakoff, just six
weeks after it was signed into law — have read this to mean it can be applied
retroactively. Thus, the first case to use the statute was Palin v. New York
Times Co.,142 a lawsuit brought by the Republican politician Sarah Palin
three years earlier, with the overarching goal of challenging Sullivan’s
actual-malice standard before the Supreme Court.143
Palin sued the Times for defamation after it published a gun-control
editorial suggesting a “SaraPAC” ad incited (via an electoral map dotted with
gun crosshairs) the shooting that nearly took Rep. Gabby Giffords’ life. The
Times had printed a correction within 48 hours, and Judge Rakoff initially
dismissed the case, ruling that the paper’s actions didn’t rise to the level of
actual malice — but he was reversed by the 2nd Circuit, which ruled the case
could move forward.144 Now, three years later, Judge Rakoff granted the
defendant’s motion to apply New York’s anti-SLAPP law. New York’s
statute — as noted earlier —does more than expedite motions to dismiss and
grant stays of discovery. In addition, it requires all plaintiffs in cases
involving an “issue of public interest” to prove actual malice. As Judge
Rakoff noted in his memorandum order, this merely required Palin to prove
under state law “what she had already been tasked with establishing under
the federal Constitution.”145
The Palin ruling turned out to be a bellwether, cited by subsequent
courts that allowed for retroactive application of the new law and
exemplifying the high-stakes, high-profile litigation that followed in 2021.146
Some striking cases suddenly shifted gears when defendants found they

141. Id. at § 2.
142. Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 510 F. Supp. 3d 21 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
143. Id. at 24. (“Although plaintiff does not dispute that she is a “public figure,” in a previously-filed
motion for partial summary judgment, she argued that she is not required to prove actual malice, and
prove it by clear and convincing evidence, on the ground that the federal constitutional rule imposing that
burden in the case of public figures either is no longer good law or does not apply to this case.”).
144. Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804 (2d. Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit was displeased with,
among other things, Judge Rakoff’s highly irregular sua sponte hearing at which he took testimony from
the editorial’s author in order to determine if Palin’s claim of actual malice was plausibly pled. Id. at 810812.
145. Of course, applying the state anti-SLAPP law also effectively blocked Palin’s original goal of
challenging the Sullivan standard.
146. See Coleman v. Grand, 523 F. Supp. 3d 244, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); Sackler v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
Inc., 71 Misc.3d 693, 697-698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021); Project Veritas v. N.Y. Times Co., No 63921/2020,
2021 WL 2395290, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 2021); Reus v. ETC Hous. Corp., 148 N.Y.S.3d 663,
669, n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021); and Lindberg v. Dow Jones, No. 20-CV-8231 (LAK), 2021 WL 3605621,
at*7, n.77 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2021).
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could file anti-SLAPP motions using the amended statute. As a result, the
first year of New York’s anti-SLAPP law produced some dramatic rulings
that also help illuminate how New York courts will likely approach the
public concern analysis.
Palin was the first of five cases in which news-media defendants filed
anti-SLAPP motions. As one might expect, the determination of “public
concern” was fairly pro forma in the majority of these. In Reus v. ETC
Housing Corporation,147 for instance, a news article about structural
deficiencies in an apartment complex clearly involved a matter of “public
interest as it concerns the fate of the Gray Gables building which has been a
matter of public concern for decades.”148 In Sackler v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,149 it was apparently so obvious that news
coverage of the opioid crisis was a matter of public concern that Justice W.
Franc Perry didn’t do a formal analysis at all — apart from rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that “anti-SLAPP protects the little guy from being put
upon by the big guy for taking part in the political process.”150 This
reasoning, Justice Perry wrote, “ignores the very purpose of the amendment
which is to broaden the scope of actionable cases involving the public
interest, in order to protect free speech ‘in a public forum with respect to
issues of public concern.’”151
Only one court balked at showing deference to traditional news media
on the public-interest question. Justice Charles D. Wood, in Project Veritas
v. New York Times Co.,152 expressed indignation that the New York Times
could now seek anti-SLAPP protection from the far-right activist group,153
which he saw as merely an “upstart competitor armed with a cell phone and

147. 148 N.Y.S.3d 663 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 2021)
148. Id. at 669. The court further pointed out, in a media friendly aside, that “Courts, for obvious
reasons, are deferential to editors in terms of what is of interest to the public and thus what is
newsworthy.” Id.
149. 71 Misc.3d 693, 697-698 (2021). Plaintiff David Sackler — who shares a name with, but is not
David Sackler of Purdue Pharma notoriety — was suing the New York Post, Reuters, Hearst Magazines
and HBO for defamation after a Getty photo of him was used mistakenly in various stories about the
Sackler family’s role in the opioid crisis. Id. at. 694-95.
150. Id. at 698 (quoting Transcript of Record at 12, Sackler v. Am Broad. Cos., Inc. 71 Misc.3d 693
(2021) (No. 155513/2019)).
151. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sponsor Memo of Sen. Hoylman in support of S52A (July 22,
2020), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s52).
152. Project Veritas, 2021 WL 2395290.
153. Deciding how to identify Project Veritas here presents a fascinating challenge. Wikipedia calls
it
“an
American
far-right
activist
group.”
Project
Veritas,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Veritas. In his opinion, Justice Wood called it “a non-profit
journalistic organization.” 2021 WL 2395290. Most recently, U.S. District Court Judge Paul Friedman
ruled that plaintiffs suing the group in his court may refer to it as a “political spying operation.” See Eric
Wemple, Judge rules that opponents may call Project Veritas a ‘political spying operation’ in ongoing
case, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/10/27/jamesokeefe-political-spying-project-veritas/).
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a web site.”154 Justice Wood, unconvinced by Project Veritas’ track record
of producing misleading ‘gotcha’ videos, begrudgingly admitted that the
Times’ anti-SLAPP claim met the amended anti-SLAPP standard —
reporting on “allegations of systemic voter fraud and potential
disinformation about such voter fraud” constituted an issue of public interest
— but nevertheless denied all the newspaper’s motions for relief.155 Justice
Wood acknowledged that Project Veritas would eventually have to prove
actual malice at trial, but only after the Times spent a small fortune in legal
fees along the way — precisely the fate that anti-SLAPP laws are designed
to avoid.
One journalistic anti-SLAPP case did require an in-depth analysis of the
public interest element. In Lindberg v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,156 plaintiff
Greg Lindberg had sued the Wall St. Journal after it reported on how
Lindberg diverted $2 billion from his financial empire for his personal use
and, in a second article, hired operatives to surveil his ex-fiancé and other
women he found attractive. Unlike the other cases, the question of public
interest was, in Lindberg, a closer call. The second article in particular
included assertions about Lindberg’s personal life that could, certainly on
their own, be cast as purely private matters. U.S. District Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan, however, noted that the court’s analysis could draw from New
York’s “robust case law,” that distinguishes between “matter of ‘public
concern’ and ‘matters of purely private concern” under the state’s unique
fault standard in defamation — a standard that echoes Rosenbloom’s now
defunct doctrine.157
In analyzing the second article, for instance, Judge Kaplan was able to
consider three cases involving articles with similar inclusions of private
information. One of these, Gaeta v. New York News, Inc.,158 concerned a
New York News piece about the state’s transfer of mental-health patients to
nursing homes, which clearly constituted “a matter of legitimate public
concern.” Within the article, though, was an account of one patient’s
breakdown after his son’s suicide — itself precipitated, according to the
article, by his mother dating other men. The mother sued, arguing that the
claim was defamatory. The New York Court of Appeals, however, defended
“the familiar journalistic technique of featuring the experiences of a single
individual, as exemplifying in human terms the plight of many,”159 and ruled
154. “Here, one of the largest newspapers in the world since Abraham Lincoln was engaged in the
private practice of law, is claiming protections from an upstart competitor armed with a cell phone and a
web site,” Justice Wood wrote. Project Veritas, 2021 WL 2395290, at*6. “Not only does the amended
Anti-SLAPP law grant protection to a Goliath against a David, but 16 years after the SLAPP law was
enacted, a newspaper had never qualified for SLAPP protection for its written articles.” Id.
155. Id.
156. 2021 WL 3605621.
157. Id. at. *8.
158. Gaeta v. N.Y. News Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 340 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).
159. Lindberg, 2021 WL 3605621, at *9 (quoting Gaeta, 62 N.Y.2d at 349-350).
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that the “offending statements can only be viewed in the context of the
writing as a whole.”160 After a heavily footnoted analysis, Judge Kaplan
found that “the Journal’s portrayal of Lindberg’s surveillance operation is
reasonably related to its report on Lindberg’s use of insurance company
funds,” which was, in turn, “clearly of public concern under New York
law.”161 Having determined this, Judge Kaplan found that Lindberg had
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of proving actual malice, and thus granted
the Journal’s motion to dismiss.162
Although importing the common-law libel “public concern” standard to
interpret New York’s amended anti-SLAPP statute could raise concerns that
resulting interpretations would not be sufficiently attuned to the spirit of the
new statute, such concerns seem unwarranted. It appears the body of
common law consulted by the Lindberg court has the same animating
concern as the statute, which is extending the public sphere as far as possible
within reason, even in situations that have a “private” appearance to some
degree. As the court put it, “the Court may not second guess the Journal’s
editorial judgment in employing the ‘journalistic technique’ of highlighting
‘human-interest items’ when reporting on a matter of public concern.”163
A nonmedia case that required an analysis of the public-interest
requirement was Coleman v. Grand.164 Steven Coleman sued María Grand
in 2018, after Grand published an open letter about their relationship in the
context of 2017’s #MeToo movement. When the two first met at a workshop
Coleman gave in 2009, the “prominent saxophonist” was 52 and married.165
Grand, an “aspiring young saxophonist” from Switzerland, was 17.166 She
asked Coleman for a lesson and, after initially saying he didn’t work with
beginners, Coleman agreed. Their sexual relationship began two years later,
after Grand moved to New York.167 It continued off-and-on, with non-stop
drama, until 2016. In the fall of 2017, after Hollywood producer Harvey
Weinstein’s arrest for sex crimes, Grand sent a letter to 40 or so recipients,
recounting her sexual history with “X,” saying she wanted to “start a larger
conversation” about “sexism in the music industry.”168
After agreeing to give the new state anti-SLAPP law retroactive effect,
the court assessed whether the statements addressed a matter of public
concern. In doing so, it noted both the broad amended statutory language
and the generous public concern jurisprudence of New York’s common law.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Lindberg, 2021 WL 3605621, at *8 (quoting Gaeta, 62 N.Y.2d at 349).
Lindberg, 2021 WL 3605621, at *10.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *10.
523. F. Supp. 3d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2021).
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 252.
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Citing one 2001 defamation case, the court noted that “New York law
considers a matter of public concern as ‘a dispute that has in fact received
public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not
direct participants.’”169 Because Grand’s statements took place against the
backdrop of a rising #MeToo movement, the court concluded that they
addressed a matter of public concern.170

V.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Although it is still early in the deployment of the new approaches in
California, New York, and Texas, it appears that each state has embarked
upon a profound evolution in the understanding of matters of public import
vis-a-vis anti-SLAPP law. This is significant not only because these states
will collectively produce a large proportion of the nation’s anti-SLAPP case
law going forward, but also because their anti-SLAPP jurisprudence will
undoubtedly have an outsized influence on other states’ laws and judicial
interpretations. California’s influence on other states’ anti-SLAPP
jurisprudence was already significant prior to the FilmOn decision, and
FilmOn itself has already been cited and discussed in the interpretation of
anti-SLAPP laws outside of California.171
Texas’ new approach is perhaps the most enigmatic of the three.
Although it was clear the Texas Legislature wanted its statutory amendments
to rein in the wide-open approach of Texas courts in cases like ExxonMobil,
the jury is still out on whether the new public interest standard will genuinely
have that effect in practice. Certainly the Connick/Snyder approach seems to
allow a fair degree of interpretive license to courts. If a matter of public
concern is defined to consist of items the public is concerned about, there is
no guarantee that the category will be significantly narrower than that of the
prior statute’s laundry list. Of course, it may be that Texas courts will get the
message the legislature intended to send, regardless of the precise text of the
new statute. The Texas amendments also narrow the statute in other ways,
including by altering other language that might affect the scope of the law’s
application172 and by crafting additional express exemptions from the law.173
Nonetheless, the exceedingly capacious media exemption promises some

169. Id. at 258 (quoting Fairley v. Peerskill Star Corp., 83 A.D.2d 294, 298 (N.Y. App. 1981)).
170. Id. at 259.
171. See, e.g., Lane Dermatology v. Smith, 861 S.E.2d 196, 204 (Ga. App. 2021) (following FilmOn
in interpretation of Georgia anti-SLAPP law); Saudi Am. Pub. Rels. Affs. Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs.,
242 A.3d 602, 611 (D.C. Ct. App. 2020) (declining to follow FilmOn).
172. Laurie Lee Prather & Robert T. Sherwin, The Changing Landscape of the Texas Citizens
Participation Act, 52 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 163, 169 (2019) (discussing how “relates to” language about
the scope of the TCPA was removed to narrow the law in its current iteration). For a case that limits the
application of the amended TCPA based on the removal of the “relates to” language, see ML Dev. v.
Ross Dress for Less, Inc., No. 01-20-00773-CV, 2021 WL 2096656, at*5 (Tex. Ct. App. May, 25, 2021).
173. Prather & Sherwin, supra note 156, at 9.
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interesting definitional problems as courts attempt to delineate its outer
limits.
California, on the other hand, has a relatively clear mandate via FilmOn
that seems likely to lead to a significantly more restricted application of its
anti-SLAPP statute. The early reception in lower courts seems to confirm
that direction. FilmOn’s primary legacy, of course, will almost certainly be
its rigorous insistence that movants cannot simply connect general
statements about which they are sued to broader public issues when that
connection is in fact tenuous. The so-called synecdoche theory of public
concern is thus declared dead. Moreover, litigants must more concretely
demonstrate that their speech could at least potentially move the public
conversation forward in some way. It must, in the words of the court,
“contribute to the public debate”174 rather than simply relate to it in some
abstract and feeble way.
Comparing California’s new approach to Texas’ amended statute, the
FilmOn methodology seems much more sophisticated than the simplistic
Connick/Snyder framework of Texas. Rather than merely offering a
tautological definition of speech of public concern, the California approach
gets under the hood and requires that the speech actually have the potential
to function in the marketplace of ideas in some substantive way. If one
wished to limit anti-SLAPP motions to situations closer to those conceived
by Canan and Pring (a position the authors of this work are certainly not
endorsing), the California approach seems a more precise and rigorous way
to achieve that.
New York’s new statute (and ensuing judicial interpretations),
somewhat ironically, has the sort of full-throttle daring perhaps more
traditionally associated with the Golden State. Emerging from a benighted
period with one of the narrowest anti-SLAPP laws in the country, New
York’s statute seems expressly designed to push public concern to its furthest
possible borders. Notably, New York courts find themselves well equipped
with the jurisprudential resources to accomplish this goal, since the state’s
common law of defamation law already offers caselaw with developed
public concern determinations that are extremely deferential to defendants.
As this work demonstrates, legislatures and courts are still attempting
to map out the contours of the public concern concept, some with greater
success than others. The authors of this work suggest that, as challenging as
it may be for overcrowded court dockets, courts err on the side of broadly
construing what speech constitutes a matter of public concern. At the end of
the day, free expression is a fragile right, and anything states can do to
advance it at the margins seems a worthy goal.

174. 7 Cal. 5th at 150.

